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Abstract—Recently, various pairing-based and pairing-free two party Key Agreement protocols in the context of Identity- Based and 
Certificateless cryptosystems have been published. The pairing-free Key Agreement protocols could improve the efficiency by eliminating 
the high expense of pairing maps. In this paper, we proposed several secure and efficient Identity- Based and Certificateless pairing-free 
two party Key Agreement protocols. In compare with related works, our protocols require less computational cost. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A cryptographic protocol that enables two or more entities to generate a shared session secret by exchanging key tokens over an 
open channel, named Key Agreement protocol. In this category of cryptographic protocols, the final session key would be driven 
from mentioned shared secret. Due to the importance of the security of the used cryptographic session key in an open channel, Key 
Agreement protocols became one of critical issues in cryptographic research area. 
The outline of this paper is to focus on two-party Key Agreement protocols in the context of Public Key Cryptography (PKC). 
Hence, existing entities possess a pair of keys; Public Key and Private Key. Based on the structure of the Public Key, it is possible to 
categorize existing public key cryptosystems in three classes named Traditional, Identity- Based and Certificateless. A Traditional 
public key cryptosystem relies on digital certificates provided by a trusted party named Certificate Authority (CA). In this group of 
cryptosystems, the need to CA leads to complex management of Public Key Infrastructure (for more details refer to [1]). To avoid 
mentioned drawback and to eliminate the need to certificates, Adi Shamir in [2] introduced a powerful theory named Identity-Based 
cryptography; replacing the users’ Public Key with their identity (e.g. telephone number, image, email address, etc.). Hence, all 
involving entities need to learn some basic information (As an identifier) before they communicate with each other. This idea was an 
open problem for seventeen years, until Boneh and Franklin could propose a fully functional Identity-Based scheme in the context of 
Encryption primitives [3]. It is worth to note that in an Identity- Based cryptosystem, each entity takes its Private Key by interacting 
with a trusted third party named Private Key Generator (PKG). As a result, PKG might be able to eavesdrop the messages or 
impersonate entities. This inherent problem of Identity-Based cryptosystems is named “Key Escrow.” To avoid this problem, the 
concept of Certificateless Public Key Cryptography (CL-PKC) was introduced by Al-Riyami and Paterson [4]. In this category of 
cryptosystems, a trusted third party named Key Generation Center (KGC) is responsible for generating partial private keys for existing 
users. This key is driven by Master Key (which is only known to KGC), and the users’ identity. Once an entity receives this key 
material, chooses a secret value and then generates considered final Private Key. Hence, there is no problem regarding to the Key 
Escrow [4]. 
In continue to what pointed above, a subset of Identity- Based and Certificateless Key Agreement Protocols have been 
proposed based on Bilinear Pairings, which maps two elements of elliptic curve based algebraic groups to an element of a 
determined finite field [5]. However, high expense of computing pairing operations persuaded researchers to propose ECC-based Key 
Agreement protocols. To improve the efficiency and supporting more security options, we proposed several Key Agreement 
protocols without bilinear pairings in the context of Identity-based and Certificateless cryptosystems. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The second section describes some preliminaries including utilized notations and 
description of main phases of Identity-Based and Certificateless Key Agreement protocols. In the next section, we present our pairing-
free Key Agreement protocols in detail. In the forth section, analysis over security and efficiency of the proposed protocols is provided. 
The last section assigns to the conclusion. 
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II. PRELIMINARIES 
This section introduces the required preliminaries for the rest of this paper. The TABLE I introduces suggested notations and 
assumptions, which are needed to realize following subsections. 
 
TABLE I. SUGGESTED NOTATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Next subsection represents detail explanations of the main phases of Key Agreement protocols, in the context of Identity- Based 
cryptosystems. 
A. Main phases of Identity-Based Key Agreement protocols 
Based on our categorization, it is possible to define an Identity-Based Key Agreement protocol in four phases. The first 
and second phases are SETUP and EXTRACTION, respectively. The utilized algorithm of the SETUP phase is responsible to generate 
Params and Master-Key, after taking the required security parameter. The first parameter, Params, is publicly known to all entities 
whereas the Master-Key is a confidential secret for PKG.  In the next phase, EXTRACTION, each entity can take his Private-Key after 
an interaction with the PKG. We named the third and fourth phases of Identity-Based Key Agreement protocols EXCHANGE and 
COMPUTATION, respectively. In the EXCHANGE phase, communicating parties compute a trapdoor one-way function of a 
randomly chosen value and exchange it. Then, in the COMPUTATION phase, parties can compute the considered session key based 
on the Params and other possessing public and secret parameters. 
 
B. Main phases of Certificateless Key Agreement protocols 
Based on our categorization, it is possible to define a Certificateless key agreement protocol in five phases, which are SETUP, 
PARTIAL-PRIVATE EXTRACT, SET- PRIVATE-PUBLIC KEYS, EXCHANGE, and COMPUTATION. Similar to the Identity-
Based Key Agreement protocols, the considered algorithm of the SETUP phase is responsible to generate Params and Master-Key, 
after taking the security parameter.  In the PARTIAL-PRIVATE EXTRACT phase, the KGC returns a partial-private to the entity who 
made a request.  Afterward, each entity chooses a random value to compute his public and private keys in SET PRIVATE-PUBLIC 
KEYS phase.  Finally, the entities can interact with each other to share the final session key in the fourth and fifth phases. 
 
III. OUR PROPOSED KEY AGREEMENT PROTOCOLS 
In this research, we propose two groups of efficient Key Agreement schemes. The first group is consisted of two Identity-Based 
cryptographic schemes, while the other one is consisted of a Certificateless scheme. The outline of current subsections is to 
investigate these protocols in detail. In all proposed   Key   Agreement   protocols,   it   is   assumed that involving entities, A and B, 
exchange one-way functions TA and TB of randomly chosen values to compute the shared secret KAB. Finally, the agreed session key 
is a key derivation function of KAB. 
A. Proposed Identity-Based Key Agreement Protocols 
In this section, we describe the proposed computationally efficient Identity-Based Key Agreement protocols which are the same in 
SETUP and EXTRACTION phases as follows: 
 
SETUP: The SETUP algorithm of the proposed Identity- Based Key Agreement protocols takes the security parameter, k, and returns 
a master key s  ∈ Zq* and  Params < q, Fq, E⁄ Fq , G, P, PPub , H1   >  that H1: {0,1}*  x G → Zq* is one-way collision-free hash function 
and other items are introduced in the TABLE I.
Notation Description 
q A large prime number 
Fq 
Fq 
a finite field over q 
E⁄  Fq 
 
Fq
an elliptic curve over  Fq 
 
G 
A  subgroup of E⁄ Fq 
 
P Generator of the group G 
PPub sP 
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EXTRACTION:   To   explain   the   EXTRACTION    phase, assume that an entity who possesses IDi identifier refers to PKG to take 
corresponding Private Key. Here, the PKG    first randomly   chooses ri  ∈r  Zq*  ,   then   computes Ri = riP  and hi = H1(IDi , Ri). The 
final Private Key of this entity would be < Ri , si  > that si = ri + his(mod q). 
Beside of two   mentioned   phases above, other phases   of proposed Identity-Based Key Agreement schemes are explained 
separately for each protocol as follows: 
  Protocol-1: Assume that two entities, A and B, are going to agree on a session key.  It is necessary to point out that all 
entities such as an entity who possesses IDi  identifier, randomly chooses xi  ∈r  Zq*  , then computes Xi = xiP , zi  = xi  + h'i si 
(mod q) , and Z i = z i P .  Here, h
'
i
 = H1(IDi, Xi). Before starting the first session, the entity A sends RA, XA to the B entity, 
while B entity returns back the values RB, XB  to the A entity. Then, EXCHANGE and COMPUTATION phases are based on 
following processes: 
 
EXCHANGE: To explain the EXCHANGE phase, mentioned entities do the following: 
(1) A chooses a random a  ∈r Zq* , computes the key token TA   =  a(sAzAZB)and sends TA  to the B entity. 
(2) B chooses a random b ∈r Zq*, computes the key  token TB = b(sBzBZA) and sends TB to the A entity. 
COMPUTATION: In this phase, the entities A and B are able to compute the shared secret as follows: 
 
A computes KAB  = [a(sA )]TB 
B computes KBA   = [b(sB)]TA 
 
Following equation proves that the two computed values for this shared secrets would be the same. 
KAB   =  [a(rA  + hAs(mod q))]TB 
= (asA )[b(sB zBzA)P] 
= (bsB )[a(sAzAzB)P] 
=  [b(rB   + hB s(mod q))]TA 
= KBA 
Before explaining the next proposed Identity-Based Key Agreement protocol, it is necessary to point out that it is possible to assume 
that zi  = xi, and Zi  = ziP. In addition, it is possible to assume zi  = xi  + si ,  and Zi  = ziP.  Applying these two assumptions for the 
EXCHANGE and COMPUTATION phases above, leads to achievement of two other versions for the Protocol-1. 
  Protocol-2: Assume that two entities, A and B, are going to agree on a session key. It is necessary to point out that all 
entities such as an entity who possesses IDi identifier, randomly   chooses xi  ∈r  Zq* , then computes X i  = x i P  , zi = xi + 
h'isi(mod q) , and Zi = ziP  .  Here,  h
'
i  = H1(IDi, Xi). Before starting the first session, the entity A sends RA, XA to the B 
entity, while B entity returns  back the values RB, XB  to the A entity. Then, EXCHANGE   and COMPUTATION phases are based 
on following processes: 
 
EXCHANGE: To explain the EXCHANGE phase, mentioned entities do the following: 
(1) A chooses a random a  ∈r Zq*, computes the key token TA = a(zAsASB) that SB = sBP. Then, sends TA to the B entity 
(2) B chooses a random b ∈r Zq* , computes the key token TB  =  b(zBsBSA) that SA   = sA P. Then, sends TB  to the A entity. 
 
COMPUTATION: In this phase, the entities A and B are able to compute the shared secret as follows:  
 
A computes KAB   =  [a  (xA  + h
'
A
  s A (mod q))]T B 
B computes KBA   =  [b (xB  + h
'
BsB(mod q))]TA 
 Following equation proves that the two computed values    for this shared secrets would be the same.
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A   A B 
B   B A 
A   A B 
B   B A 
KAB  = [a  (xA  + h
'
A
  sA  (mod q))] T B 
=  (azA)[b(zBsBsA)P] 
=  (bzB )[a(zAsAsB )P] 
= [b(xB  + h
'
A
  sA  (mod q))]T A 
= KBA 
Before explaining our proposed Certificateless Key Agreement protocol, it is necessary to point out that it is possible to 
assume that zi  = xi, and Zi  = ziP. In addition,  it is  possible  to  assume zi  = xi  + si ,  and Zi  = ziP .    Applying these     two   
assumptions     for     the     EXCHANGE   and COMPUTATION phases above, leads to achievement of two other versions for the 
Protocol-2. 
B.   Proposed Certificateless Key Agreement Protocol 
In this section, we describe the proposed computationally efficient Certificateless Key Agreement protocol. 
  Protocol-3: The SETUP, PARTIAL-PRIVATE- EXTRACT and SET-PUBLIC-PRIVATE KEYS phases are as follows: 
 
SETUP: This algorithm takes the security parameter and returns a master key s  ∈ Zq*and Params 
< q, Fq, E⁄ Fq , G, P, PPub , H1   > that H1: {0,1}*  x G → Zq* . 
 
PARTIAL-PRIVATE-EXTRACT: This algorithm takes ri  ∈r  Zq*  and computes R i   = r i P  and hi  = H1(IDi , Ri) .Then, the partial-
private-key of the user i  will be si  = ri + his(mod q). 
 
SET-PUBLIC-PRIVATE KEYS: This algorithm takes xi  ∈r  Zq* and computes Xi  = x i P, z i = x  + h'i s i (mod q), and Zi  = ziP. 
Here, hi 
'   = H1  (ID i ,X  i ). The private and public key of the user i will be SKi = (si, xi) and PKi = (Ri, Si, Xi) , respectively.  Here, 
the value of  Si  = (Ri  + hiPpub ) = siP will be publicly computable  by all  entities.  Beside of three mentioned phases above, other 
phases of the proposed Certificateless Key Agreement scheme are as follows: 
 
 
.EXCHANGE: To explain the EXCHANGE phase, mentioned entities do the following: 
(1) A chooses a random a  ∈r Zq* , computes the key token TA = a(zAsASB). Then, sends TA to the B entity. 
(2) B chooses a random b ∈r  Zq* , computes the key token TB  = b(zBsBSA). Then, sends TBto the A entity.  
 
COMPUTATION: In this phase, the entities A and B are able to compute the shared secret as follows: 
A computes KAB   =  [a  (xA  + h
'  s  (mod q))]T 
B computes KBA  =  [b (xB  + h
'  s   (mod q))]T 
 
Following equation proves that the two computed values    for this shared secrets would be the same. 
KAB  = [a (xA  + h
'  s  (mod q))] T 
= (azA)[b(zBsBsA)P] 
= (bzB )[a(zAsAsB )P] 
= [b(xB + h
, s  (mod q))]T 
= KBA 
 
It is worth to note that it is possible to consider other condition for this protocol in a way that an entity who possesses IDi 
identifier, randomly chooses xi ∈r Zq* ,  then  computes  X i  = xiP .  It is possible to assume zi  = xi  + si , and Zi  = ziP .  Applying 
these two assumptions for the EXCHANGE and COMPUTATION phases above, leads to achievement of two other versions for the 
Protocol-3. 
 
IV. SECURITY AND EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS 
In this section, we are going to discuss about the security and efficiency of the proposed protocols. Our proposed Key Agreement 
protocols could achieve all security attributes and it is efficient in compare with other existing related works.
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A. Security Considerations 
One possible method for evaluating the security of key agreement protocols is the use of following security properties as defined in  
[6, 7]. 
  Known-Key Security (KKS): To satisfy this security property, peer entities should generate a unique secret session key which 
is independent from generated secret session keys in past sessions. Therefore, any knowledge about past secret session keys 
do not allow deducting future secret session keys. 
  Forward Secrecy (FS): The Forward Secrecy property is that if long-term private keys of the entity(ies) be compromised, the 
previously established  session keys must be still secret. 
  Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS): A system has Perfect Forward Secrecy if previously established session keys by entities are 
not corrupted even after compromising the long-term keys of all the involving entities (including the Key Generation Center). 
  Key-Compromise Impersonation: A protocol is secure against Key Compromise Impersonation attack if compromising the 
long-term key of one entity help the adversary to impersonate the victim to others but does not lead to impersonating others to 
the victim. 
  Unknown Key-Share Resilience: A protocol is resilient against the Unknown Key-Share attack, if the entity does not share the 
secret session key with the adversary. Unknown Key-Share happens when the adversary convinces the entity to share a secret 
session key with him while victim mistakenly believes that he shared a secret with a legitimate entity. 
  Key Control: To satisfy this security property, the generated key should be determined jointly by both peer entities; not 
predetermined by one of them alone. 
  Known Session-Specific Temporary Information: a protocol is vulnerable against this attack if an adversary can compute 
ks  by assuming the leakage of a and b. 
 
Since the agreed keys in our proposed protocols satisfy all above mentioned security attributes, our protocols are secure against 
mentioned issues. In addition, by assuming that the entities A and B compute a Message Authentication Code (MAC) of a 
significant message by the use of the agreed key ks , and exchange the result with each other, our proposed protocols support key 
conformation property and prevent Key Off-Set attack (for more detail refer to [8]). 
B. Efficiency Considerations 
Related to our protocols, a subset of Identity-Based and Certificateless Key Agreement Protocols have been proposed. A two-party 
Identity-Based Key Agreement without bilinear pairings has been proposed by Cao et al. in [9] that has four scalar multiplications 
and one addition. The proposed protocol by Hafizul Islam et al. in [8] has only three scalar multiplications and one point addition. 
Moreover, in 2014 another pairing-free two-party Identity-Based Key Agreement scheme has been proposed by Farash et al. in [10] 
that has four scalar multiplications. In addition, in the context of Certificateless Key Agreement protocols without pairings, Hou et al. 
proposed a protocol with four scalar multiplications [11]. The proposed protocol by Geng et al. in [12] computes five scalar 
multiplications. In 2011, He et al. in [13] proposed another protocol that computes four scalar multiplications and one point addition 
for key computation. Moreover, another scheme is proposed in [14] based on computing four scalar multiplications and two point 
additions. 
The TABLE II depicts details of some proposed protocols and the assigned computational costs. 
As we can see in TABLE II, from efficiency viewpoint, our proposed Key Agreement protocols only compute three scalar 
multiplications without computing any point addition for each communicating entities, which are quite efficient.
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TABLE II. EFFICIENCY COMPARISIONS OF DIFFERENT PROTOCOLS 
 
Authors Exchange and computation 
from A entity viewpoint 
Computed Exponentiation 
(Scalar Multiplication) 
Computed point addition Efficiency 
Consideration 
Cao et al. [9] TA = aP, TB = bP  
K1AB 
    = sA TB   + aS B 
K2AB
    = aTB 
 
aP, sATB, aSB, aTB (sBTA) + (bSA) 4 Exponentiation 
(Scalar Multiplication) 
1 point addition 
Islam et al. [8] TA = aSA, TB = bSB  
KAB   = sA[TB  + aSB] 
aSA, aSB, sA[TB   + aSB] TB   + (aSB) 3 Exponentiation 
(Scalar Multiplication) 
1 point addition 
He et al. [13] TA    = aP, TB   = bP 
K1AB
    = (xA + sA  )T B + a  (X B + S B ) 
K2AB
    = aTB 
aP, (xA + sA)TB, 
a(XB  + SB), aTB 
[(xA  + sA)TB] + [a(XB + SB )] 4 Exponentiation (Scalar 
Multiplication) 
1 point addition 
He et al. [14] TA    = aP, TB   = bP 
K1AB
    = (a  + sA  )[TB   + SB ] 
K2AB
    = (a  + xA  )[TB   + XB ] 
K3AB
    = aTB 
aP, (a  + sA)[TB + SB], 
(a  + xA)[TB  + XB], aTB 
(TB  + SB ), (TB  + XB) 4 Exponentiation (Scalar Multiplication) 
2 point addition 
Our proposed 
Protocol-1 
TA = a  (sAzAZB), TB = b(sBzBZA)  
KAB   = [asA]TB 
a  (sAzAZB), [asA]TB - 3 Exponentiation (Scalar Multiplication) 
Our proposed 
Protocol-2 
TA = a  (zAsASB), TB = b(zBsBSA)  
KAB   = [azA ]TB 
a  (zAsASB), [azA]TB - 3 Exponentiation (Scalar Multiplication) 
Our proposed 
Protocol-3 
TA = a  (zAsASB), TB = b(zBsBSA)  
KAB   = [azA ]TB 
a  (zAsASB), [azA]TB - 3 Exponentiation (Scalar Multiplication) 
 
 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
Due to the high computational cost of Bilinear Pairings, the pairing-free cryptosystems attracted researchers in recent years. In this 
area, a subset of pairing-free Key Agreement protocols in the context of Identity-Based and Certificateless cryptosystems have been 
proposed. In this paper, we could propose several secure and authenticated Identity-Based and Certificateless two-party Key 
Agreement protocols without pairings. The proposed protocols are efficient in compare with related works. 
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